![]() Each theory of victory identifies, describes, and estimates the relative priorities of the service’s critical attributes and tasks of warfare. Each military service has a theory of victory. Army manifest itself in military- strategic choice before and during Operation Desert Storm? To answer this question, this thesis parses the motivations for what and how the military services do what they do. The research question for this thesis is How did the interaction between institutional theories of victory of the U.S. The purpose of this thesis is to aid leaders, strategists, and practitioners in avoiding the resultant friction when these theories of victory diverge, which if not constrained can impair the prudent joint planning and conduct of war. In the blending of these dissimilar modes of warfare, the planning and conduct of warfare becomes shaped by inputs from these theories of victory. The functional forms of warfare are constructed by the military services, each with a distinctive theory of victory. This article looks at how those air power might be used at the strategic level to force insurgent leaders to quit the fight and join the political process, and at the tactical level to restore security and stability. Air power, traditionally employed in a kinetic manner, has a powerful role to play as both a coercive and an influencing mechanism in irregular warfare. Therefore, coercive applications of power by the government need to be applied against the adversary leadership, i.e., the decision-makers, and positive, influencing actions are employed to convince the populace that the government can defend them and will provide the services necessary to earn and maintain their allegiance. The government forces must win the allegiance of the people, while the insurgents force the support through coercion. Although irregular warfare is a struggle for the allegiance and support of the population, the antagonists play by different rules. ![]() In both theory and application, air power has the ability to change people’s behaviours through the parallel mechanisms of influence and coercion. Part two describes the Air Force’s adaptation to modern expectations of civilian protection, tracing operational experiences during the 1990s and the consequent operational and institutional innovation. Part one outlines the challenge that contemporary expectations about the American use of force pose for airpower. Technology, adversaries, and the goals of armed conflict will continue to evolve, but the central challenge of humanizing war will endure. ![]() The recent evolution of US airpower offers inspiring, if incomplete, evidence that the conduct of war can become more humane while remaining effective. The author expands perspectives on assessing and directing the use of airpower and encourages further work to maximize both mission accomplishment and civilian protection. This book examines how international expectations intersected with the United States Air Force’s fight for autonomy and utility, explains how the service began to change, and asks how airpower-and the US military as a whole-might further deepen its efforts. ![]()
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